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CIG

Cited Darling ^{TS}/40(2)
April 2, 1952 ^{IV}/24(2)

Douglass, Kingman

Interview on "CIG"

April 2, 1952

Regarding the initial episodes, Douglass gave two impressions: ignorance of some and reluctance to talk about others until, I suppose, he knew me better. Before long, however, he was voluble enough and outspoken, even critical of some persons. For instance, General Bissell, he said, was no fool; Bissell understood intelligence, knew more about it than Vandenberg.

The opportunity came several times to ask why Douglass had left the Group in the summer of 1946. It was apparent that he did not intend to tell me why. So, I did not ask. But silence made it unmistakable, I thought, that he did not choose to stay in the Vandenberg administration. Douglass is one of those persons of independent means who can go and come just about as he sees fit. Several references to his trip to Europe with Wm. H. Jackson in July - August, 1946 for further information on the British intelligence system loosened Mr. Douglass' reluctance. He talked at length about General Sibert.

It seems that Sibert was to be head of all operations including secret collection, when "SSU" had been removed. Drew Pearson's attack on Sibert for expenditure of American lives in the Ardennes, as well as the much discussed feud with "Pinky" Wright, made General Sibert practically useless to the Agency. He had too much notoriety. Douglass and Jackson had gone to Europe

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to get Sibert released for "CIG." They had seen General McNarney and other staff to obtain Sibert. He was supposed not only to

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head "operations" but in time possibly to take Vandenberg's place as "DCI." Douglass said that he himself was very upset by the outcome. He felt that Jackson and he appeared to be guilty of false pretenses in their assurances to Sibert.

Regarding Souers' appointment as Director of Central Intelligence, Douglass said that Souers was chosen because he was a personal friend of President Truman. He was accustomed to have luncheon at the White House almost daily. I asked if Souers' previous record in intelligence justified the appointment. Douglass replied that Souers had been in "counterintelligence" rather than "secret collection." There was no inference that Souers was less qualified on that account.

I then asked if one of the reasons why "CIG" appeared to be slow in picking up the facilities offered by General Magruder as head of "SSU" was a propensity of Souers to call a committee representing the Departments. I spoke of the plan to have the Intelligence Advisory Board, and under it the Central Planning Staff, appraise the work of "SSU" although, to me, it seemed as though Magruder's reports were clear and convincing.

Douglass did not object to my implication but was mild in replying: "Well, perhaps so." The facts were, he said, they had so much organizing to do and many of them had no particular experience upon which to draw. I did not say what was in my mind, that they had at hand such experienced men as Montague and Lay. But later in the conversation, their names came up. Douglass

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remarked that Lay was able and experienced; that I should talk with him. I did not learn what Douglass thought of Montague.

NATIONAL ESTIMATES. I asked if they had in mind to make the Central Reports Staff an estimating board. Douglass replied that they were very far from any idea of national estimates at that time. I demurred a bit, however, by saying that such estimating of the sort as was done at the time occurred in the JIC. This remark stabbed his memory. He assented at once and then said that of course the end in view was the establishment of a system of national estimates. He meant to say that they were pretty far from accomplishing. Their so-called estimates were no more than daily summaries. When I went on to suggest that ORE may have done some "national estimating," I had in mind of course the opinion of ~~Mr. Jackson~~ ^{Mr. Jackson} that they had not; Mr. Douglass did not take the bait. I thought it was simply because he had left the Group and really did not know much about ORE.

Fortier. When Colonel Fortier's name came into our conversation, Douglass had little to say except that Fortier was slated to take over operations. I commented that he did not stay very long after Vandenberg arrived. Then Douglass said that General Vandenberg did not have "a very high regard" for Fortier's ability to handle his job.

Vandenberg. Throughout this conference General Vandenberg's name came out from time to time. I said that I had seen him. Mr. Douglass evinced no particular interest and took none of the leads

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offered. I have noted that in another connection he compared Vandenberg's knowledge of intelligence with Bissell's.

Inglis. Douglass praised Admiral Inglis. This was interesting to me for I had formed an opinion of Inglis from reading the minutes of the IAB meetings, an opinion which was not so high.

Central Planning Staff. I spoke of Central Planning Staff but got nothing from Mr. Douglass about it. He said the problem was primarily one of personnel. He said that the Navy Department gave him access to their portfolio and let him run through their list. He could have just about whom he wished. This does not tally with Montague's experience in the Central Reports Staff.

I asked Douglass where Admiral Souers went after leaving the Group. Douglass replied that he never wanted to keep the office and was glad to turn it over to somebody else. I further asked what Souers did between the time he was "DCI" and his service with "NSC." Mr. Douglass guessed that he had returned to his farm.

Mr. Douglass respected Colonel Quinn very much. When Galloway took over, he "liquidated about everything." Quinn succeeded Magruder as head of "SSU." Galloway was the first Assistant Director, Office of Special Operations.

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F: CIG

Douglass, Kingman

Second Interview

May 28, 1952

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We took the questions in order. He was immediately affable and not so guarded as during our first talk on April 2.

1. Do you think that the CIG Council could have been developed into a more effective "coordinating" institution than the Intelligence Advisory Board? The Council met daily. The Board hardly once a month.

Mr. Douglass had to be reminded often as his memory was cold. The Council was taken seriously by Souers and did effective work for him. Douglass did not think however that it could have developed much beyond being a council for the DCI. I told him that Lay described it in detail to Vandenberg, but that the Advisory Council which Vandenberg established was nothing of the sort so far as I could discern. Douglass thought that the IAB at that time was feeble, and the NIA too. He said that Byrnes was not interested. I remarked that Byrnes was away most of the time. Even so, Douglass stood his ground. Byrnes was not interested.

2. Should CIG have taken on the function of research and analysis or merely have expanded the Central Reports Staff so that it could make estimates from the "evaluated intelligence" provided by the Departments?

Yes. Research and analysis was absolutely necessary. None of the Departments, including State, was doing an adequate job. He enlarged upon the great value of the work which has been done by ORR and OSI in research for intelligence estimates. I made no comment on OSI. I do not know whether Douglass meant that it was effective as an office of the Agency in connection with other offices but he did say that OSI had done a lot of valuable

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research and analysis. I am sure that he was convinced that ORR has done much more economic exploration than State ever had done or is capable of doing. State, he said, was more useful for political matters. ORR, I suggested, has contacts with universities and professional organizations. I was thinking of Harvard and M.I.T. He agreed and spoke of others but did not give me a list.

3. Was there any need to have ICAPS replace the Central Planning Staff in July, 1946?

He thought so. He said that Central Planning Staff did not have very good personnel. He did not give names. I said that previous and subsequent records of some of the men seemed to indicate ability. He said yes, they were able but they were not very good on that staff. I remarked that it had been abandoned anyway on July 20. Well, within a week Donald Edgar was at work developing another planning staff. Douglass said that they needed planners at the time. There was so much to do. I remarked that for a while at least Vandenberg seems to have thought of letting the men who had the jobs to perform, have the business of planning for them as well. He agreed that there was a great tendency for men without experience or the responsibility of performing to engage in making plans for others to carry out. But after this exchange of the same idea, he returned to the statement that ICAPS was essential, chiefly for coordinating with the Departments. He agreed that it became troublesome to other offices within the Group. But he said that he had left by that time and knew little about the matter.

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4. What happened to the Defense Project of which Mr. Parkman was coordinator for CIG? Could it have been developed into a permanent interdepartmental activity for "research and analysis" to produce strategic intelligence for national estimates on Soviet "capabilities and intentions?"

He knew practically nothing about the Defense Project. He was quite interested in what I said of it and suggested that I see Mr. Parkman who has been here recently and probably will return from time to time. He had no idea whether the project could have been developed as suggested. I gave him Maury's idea that the Project's inability to do some things may have incited those activities by CIG. But Douglass just did not know.

5. Was it expected that Penrose should head the work in the Office of Special Operations when "FSRO" (SI-X2) went out of existence?

He thought highly of Penrose and said point-blank he thought proportionately little of Colonel Galloway. Penrose was to head the work and he should have done so; but Galloway got rid of Penrose as soon as he could. Douglass thought as much of Colonel Quinn. Penrose and Quinn were excellent men who should have had the jobs in the new Group. He went on to tell me who Galloway was. A soldier in World War I who rose from private to lieutenant, gaining admission to West Point where he was in Vandenberg's class. Galloway was a tall fellow, commanding in appearance and manner. He was an excellent man to do an assigned task. But otherwise Douglass had no particular interest in his personality. I told him the story going the rounds of Galloway telling Quinn he was "a soldier"; an order was an order. Douglass' reply was that Quinn was a very fine man.

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6. What is your view on the matter of "individual versus collective responsibility" for national estimates?

This question took some time for me to make clear what I meant and to draw his conclusions. He seemed timid about it, not from reluctance to talk but uncertainty in thinking. He was hardly to be blamed, in view of the general uncertainty I have encountered so far. Douglass favored in the end the opinion which General Smith holds (according to Douglass) that the DCI is responsible for a staff of experts who can handle the evidence and present a reasoned opinion supported by the facts. This does not preclude dissents equally reasoned and supported by different interpretations of the facts. Of course, there is the rub. The fact is hard enough to determine. Proper interpretation of fact is also fact. This is one of the battle grounds of the historical profession. It must be infinitely more trying for the members of ONE who know that their reasoned opinion or "estimate" is not an academic question. It may be utterly foolish tomorrow, thanks to some capricious action by some relatively irresponsible Soviet agent. Suppose that somebody got trigger happy in the streets of Berlin tomorrow. Douglass reduced "collective responsibility" to the "working level," for example, to a task force of representatives from the Departments working with the experts in ONE. But he did not dismiss entirely the usefulness of the Intelligence Advisory Committee.

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7. From the point of view of institutional development, (not political nor personal) should General Vandenberg have tried to make the Director "executive agent" in the summer of 1946?

We talked over this one at length but really got to no conclusion whether Vandenberg should have delayed. Douglass' opening was along the line of opposition to General Donovan's attempt to "run everything." (I don't have that point of view. I do not think that Donovan "wanted to run everything," in the sense of being just high-handed and dictatorial. He did not like compromise. Recall Magruder's letter to him about his "pet abomination.") Douglass brought J. Edgar Hoover into the discussion about this time, anyway in this connection. But in my opinion there is a very great difference between Vandenberg's purposes and Hoover's performances as I have seen them on paper and heard of them from Vandenberg's contemporaries. Douglass said that they all were looking forward to statutory position. They were waiting for the unification which was already in legislative process. He did not know whether Vandenberg should have pressed so hard in the summer of '46. He did think that the Group needed research and analysis and other functions. At this point he brought up the question of legality of the word "group" versus "agency" as of the Presidential Directive. He seemed to think that they had to use the word "group" for legal reasons. I suggested that perhaps it was not the major reason. He thought that I should study the matter again, because his memory was that the legal advisors insisted upon the word "group" in January 1946. "Budget" did think so.


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8. Was the original intention to expand the Office of "B" Deputy and Chief of Foreign Commerce within the Office of Special Operations?

At first he said he did not believe that he could answer the question. I did not know whether he was reluctant because of personal factors or he could not remember. In the course of our talk he said that he had gotten the idea of interviewing American business men and institutions while in England during the war. It was a rich source of information. He modestly claimed, not exclusive creation of the idea, but partnership in it. I gathered that he was the one who did suggest B Deputy Office. I doubt however that he foresaw that Colonel Galloway would be his chief. In any case, he said that he was practically out of the Group when he made the trip to London for Vandenberg with Jackson at the end of July. He came back merely to clear up some business which of course included his letter of August 26 with regard to CIG 12. He left in September before Sibert arrived. Whatever the original intention with regard to the Office of B Deputy, Douglass agreed that the two functions of overt and clandestine collection should be kept separate. He thought that whatever the original intention they would have been separated very quickly because of their natures.

9. Was the separation from Special Operations merely caused by controversy over General Sibert's appointment? Or were there decisive reasons for separating clandestine from overt operations in the collection of foreign intelligence?

He said specifically twice, deliberately stressing it:

"We went to get Sibert from General McNarney's Staff to be the



Deputy." I asked "Deputy DCI?" Douglass said yes. I said that I thought that he went over to invite Sibert for Vandenberg to take over all operations, both covert and overt, with the possibility that he might eventually become DDCI. Douglass repeated just what he said. Later he remarked, as we came back to the question, that Vandenberg "cooled off" rapidly when Sibert arrived. I remarked that it was, then, a personal matter. Douglass thought so. He could not recall, he said, probably because he had left in September, the exact circumstances in which the Office of Operations was created. But it should have been separated, as it was, from the Office of Special Operations. I did not press Mr. Douglass to say whether he would have stayed to head such an independent office, clearly one of his original ideas; he was reticent about making any personal remarks concerning himself in relationship either to Galloway or Wright or Vandenberg. He did not hesitate to characterize them candidly. He just did not involve himself. My reaction was that he was keeping his thoughts to himself through courtesy.

10. Do such distinctions exist today? Or does the separation of OO from OSO (and OPC) continue because OO started separately in 1946?

The distinctions do exist. The offices should be kept separate as much as possible although there is an overlap in places.

11. What is the distinction in your mind between counterintelligence and counterespionage? There are various interpretations. I am uncertain regarding the prevailing definitions.

Counterintelligence applies to selfprotection, CIC in the Army, I&S in CIA and similar organizations. Mr. Douglass wished

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
to consider it entirely distinct from counterespionage. FBI does counterespionage within the United States as well as counterintelligence for protection of its own operators.

12. Was the FBI better equipped than CIG in the fall of 1946 to interview "non-governmental groups" and individuals?

Probably, for purposes of detecting subversion. But it was not better equipped for interviewing business men, representatives of institutions, scientists, travellers. Douglass recalled his statement in August regarding the staff which he expected to establish in New York (See letter August 26 in our file) and his desire that CIG should have a "monopoly" of interrogation. It was at this point that he remarked that he had been interested while in London during the war in observing the British use of this source of intelligence. I credited him with being one of the originators. He smiled and said, "Well, not solely," and further words to that effect. Nevertheless, it apparently was one of his first suggestions for the Agency. I remarked that Donovan had done something of the kind in OSS days, but Douglass did not respond. I gathered that he did not know much about OSS. This may have been erroneous but it was my impression. Douglass had associations with OSS during the war.


13. I asked him if Vandenberg had the legal right to establish OO. He thought so. I did not go into the argument pro and con. I gather that Douglass thinks as I do that CIG was denied exclusive rights to interrogate but was not kept from setting up its own field offices of collection.

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14. At the end of the conference I spoke of the necessity in time for papers on OCI and Communications. I said that they might be so sensitive that they would be kept in the Director's Historical Collection. I explained what the collection was to be as I thought of it, a place where the DCI should have historical records available which would not necessarily be known to persons in other branches of government having access to the special study of Central Intelligence and this Agency. I talked at some length on other papers of this sort. He understood and remarked that when the time came it would be a matter for his advisory council. Then he said that Jackson, Bohlen and Brownell did their work in a room across the hall. We were at the door as I was leaving. I replied, "Do their work," with accent on the word "work." He smiled and thanked me for coming.

In the course of discussing the Sibert affair, I remarked that I had heard that General Vandenberg and Colonel Galloway had been in some conference with General Sibert either in Europe or here, regarding his appointment. But, said I, it did not seem to me logical for Vandenberg to send Douglass and Jackson in July to interview Sibert if he and Galloway had done so. We had checked Vandenberg's record in the CIA Military Personnel Morning Reports; they contained no record of his being away from Washington during June, July and August. Douglass said, "Why, I thought he went to Latin America with Eisenhower about that time." I replied that we had nothing on such a trip. It seemed to me that the conference



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between Vandenberg and Sibert either occurred early in the spring before Vandenberg became DCI or sometime in August or September. Douglass replied that he had left CIG by the first of September, in fact he had done very little after his return from England except of course his report of August 26 in connection with CIG 12. Douglass spoke again of the harm done by Drew Pearson's attack upon Sibert. Pearson accused Sibert of responsibility for the bloodshed in the battle of the Ardennes and charged that such a man should not have high position in the central intelligence organization. Douglass was quite sure that Pearson's attack, with Vandenberg's personal reaction, kept Sibert from becoming the Deputy. He asked me also if I had talked with Carey and Crowe. I said that I had, with Crowe, and looked forward to conferring with Carey.